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Abstract
A growing number of scholars are asking how the law would be different if it took women's points of view and
experiences into account. Feminist Jurisprudence argues that we must look at the norms embedded in our
legal system and rethink the law. It is about being inclusive of women, and of all people who differ from the
norms of the law as it is today. The endeavor will necessarily shake up established relations between family, the
workplace and the state. Lawyers, judges, and legislators should get ready for the changes.
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FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: WHY LAW 
MUST CONSIDER WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVES 
A growing number of scholars-and people in general-are asking how the law would be different if 
it took women's points of view and 
experiences into account. 
They are critical of a justice system that 
imagines a world where money damages 
solve most problems. They see social 
madness in the rule that a person may be 
sued successfully for negligence if she 
helps an accident victim imperfectly but 
not if she ignores the person altogether. 
They are appalled at how the Internal 
Revenue Service seems bound by the idea 
that marriages are of one type: a "head" 
partner who makes money and another 
partner who does not. They think lawyers 
need to listen more carefully to their 
clients. 
If these concerns ring a bell, you may 
take comfort from Feminist Jurispru-
dence. 
Feminist Jurisprudence argues that we 
must look at the norms embedded in our 
legal system and rethink the law. What is 
"equality" or an "injury" in light of 
broader understandings of those norms? 
An example of the influence of 
Feminist Jurisprudence is a recent case 
adopting the "reasonable woman" stan-
dard when judging whether a work en-
vironment is so hostile as to constitute 
sexual harassment. In Ellison v. Brady 
(924 F. 2d 'ifl2 [1991]), the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a 
ruling that a man's behavior toward a 
woman co-worker was "trivial" and 
found that women could have found the 
behavior frightening. The court decided 
that "a sex-blind reasonable person stan-
dard tends to be male-biased and tends to 
systematically ignore the experiences of 
women." Since it was decided in January, 
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Ellison has been cited by federal district 
courts in Maine and Hawaii and by the 
Third and Ninth Circuits. 
The federal courts finally are recogniz-
ing what feminist scholars have been urg-
ing for over a decade: women may see 
things differently from men. Traditional 
"equal rights" approaches to the treat-
ment of women by the law have not taken 
our different points of view into account. 
As a result, the law has tended to give 
women the right to be the same as men-a 
goal that is impossible for some and not 
desired by others. 
HThe low has tended 
to give women the 
right to be the some 
as men-o goal that 
is impossible for 
some and not 
desired by others:' 
For example, in General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert (429 U.S. 125 [1976]) the Supreme 
Court reasoned that excluding pregnant 
women from medical benefits' was a 
gender neutral practice, because nonpreg-
nant women were not affected. Congress 
passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
in 1982 to begin to remedy that idea. 
A more subtle example of "gender 
neutral" gone awry comes from family 
law. In the '60s and '70s, many states 
changed the preference for giving custody 
to mothers to a "best interests of the 
child" standard. Studies show that those 
changes have given custody preference to 
the parent with the greatest economic 
power. That custody preference may be 
traded by the wealthier parent for lower 
property settlements and child support 
payments. The effect is that mothers still 
get custody more often than fathers, but 
women and their children are more im-
poverished than ever before by divorce. 
Though we aspire to have the govern-
ment treat us in "gender neutral" ways, 
the reality is that our lives are gendered. 
Ignoring that fact may perpetuate an ine-
quality more insidious than before. Rules 
that prefer the wealthier parent, in a 
society where women still earn only 70 % 
of what men earn, in practice grant 
special favor to men. 
Feminist Jurisprudence points out that 
what is neutral or natural for one person 
is a distortion for another person. 
Pregnancy, child rearing and other care-
giving activities are still treated in the 
workplace as peculiar occurrences, rather 
than what they are: commonplace func-
tions that serve the larger good. This 
reflects the reality that the workplace was 
designed largely from a traditional male 
viewpoint. 
For instance, state laws may disqualify 
women from unemployment insurance 
benefits when they leave a job because of 
childbirth, though a person laid off 
because of a broken leg or refusing to 
work on a religious holiday would be 
eligible (Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial 
Relations Commission of Missouri, 107 
S. Ct. 821 [1987] and Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Commission, 107 
S. Ct. 1046 [19'ifl]). There's no sense of 
the unique requirements of childbirth nor 
of children as a natural part of a worker's 
life here: there is supposed to be someone 
at home full-time to take care of them and 
of other details. 
In Minnesota, 90% of judges are men, 
80% oflawyers are men, 80% of the state 
legislators are male, and 72 % of law pro-
fessors are men. This social reality means 
that women's experiences need advocacy 
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and explaining. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
recently took the real facts of a woman's 
life seriously in a precedent-setting case. 
In McCourtney v. Imprimis Technology, 
Inc. (465 N.W. 2d 721 [1991]), the court 
acknowledged that it may not always be 
possible to keep care-giving respon-
sibilities at home separate from the 
workplace. The judges decided that a 
woman who was fired for missing too 
much work to care for a chronically sick 
baby had not shown a lack of concern for 
her job and was eligible for unemploy-
ment insurance. A woman attorney-
Martha Ballou, '87-brought the case, 
and it was decided two to one by a panel 
that included a woman judge in the 
majority. 
If the case had been appealed to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, the appellants 
would have faced a new female majority 
and at least two justices who had primary 
responsibility for raising children while 
working. No one expects these 
distinguished women to make any sudden 
departures from precedent. Nor should 
women judges be expected to side 
automatically with women litigants. Yet 
we can hope that having a female 
perspective built in to Minnesota's 
highest court will mean that not as much 
time will have to be spent litigating the 
subtleties of women's experience. 
Feminist Jurisprudence asserts that 
each of us has a perspective and must 
become more conscious of that perspec-
tive. We must learn to take all kinds of 
other people's experiences into account 
when arriving at solutions for our clients, 
our constituents, our communities. One 
of the values in having women, poor peo-
ple, and men of color allowed to enter 
law schools, courtrooms and legislatures 
is that different lenses are focused on the 
law. 
The power of perspective was il-
luminated in the '80s by Carol Gilligan, 
a social scientist who sparked much of the 
thinking that we refer to as Feminist 
Jurisprudence. Gilligan wondered why 
girls and women consistently scored 
lower than boys and men on tests for 
moral development. She found that the 
scales for measuring moral development 
were developed by men researchers using 
male subjects. 
Those moral development scales were 
used for years. Yet no one before asked 
the question that now seems obvious: 
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might the test be unconsciously biased? 
Might the testers have failed to take into 
account their male point of view when 
finding that females were less morally 
developed than males? 
Gilligan's research found that girls 
more often approached problems with an 
"ethic of care," while boys more often 
used an "ethic of justice." Further 
research has shown that women in our 
society, when responding to moral dilem-
mas, are more likely to ask how everyone 
can be taken care of and relationships 
maintained, while men are more likely to 
ask which individual's rights are higher 
on the justice ladder. Men tend to place 
a higher value on rules, competition, and 
reason; women tend to value relation-
ships, nurturing, and empathy. 
It is still a matter of debate whether 
those and other differences between men 
and women are innate or good-the result 
of women's ability and training to bear 
and nurture children-or whether the car-
ing traits have been inculcated in women 
for the comfort and pleasure of men, the 
group in power. 
A proponent of the latter view is 
Catherine MacKinnon, another thinker 
who has inspired much feminist legal 
scholarship. MacKinnon began prodding 
the liberal women's movement in the late 
'70s on grounds that the push for equali-
ty had not addressed the real issues of 
male dominance and the reduction of 
women to sex objects. She was a law pro-
fessor at the University of Minnesota 
when she co-authored the Minneapolis 
antipornography ordinance, which 
redefined pornography as discrimination 
against women and sparked much debate 
about free speech and violence against 
women. (The ordinance was passed by 
the Minneapolis City Council in 
December, 1983, then vetoed by Mayor 
Donald Fraser.) 
MacKinnon's ideas have been influen-
tial. She is credited with developing the 
now orthodox idea that sexual harassment 
in the workplace is a form of discrimina-
tion. Until the latter half of the '70s, sex-
ual harassment on the job was not con-
sidered an actionable injury to women, 
and several national studies showed that 
it was very common. Now defined as a 
violation of Title VII, it was the first area 
of discrimination law where the perspec-
tive of the victim was legally as important 
as the intentions of the perpetrator. 
MacKinnon (now a professor at the 
University of Michigan Law School) 
points out that sexual harassment law is 
also the first time in history' 'that women 
have defined women's injuries in a law." 
Feminist Jurisprudence, which in-
cludes the work of many scholars, 
lawyers, judges, legal workers, 
legislators, and scientists, is looking at 
methods of lawyering, at the content of 
the law, and at the structure of the law. 
For example, Leslie Bender, a professor 
at Syracuse University Law School, has 
developed the idea that torts rules should 
incorporate care and concern into their 
standards, rather than focusing solely on 
reason and caution. Bender will deliver 
the annual Pirsig lecture at William Mit-
chell College of Law this fall (see page 
16). 
The laws of wills and marital property 
have been critiqued by Prof. Mary 
Louise Fellows, holder of the Everett 
Fraser chair at the University of Min-
nesota Law School, in her inaugurallec-
ture earlier this year. She is the first 
woman to hold an endowed chair at the 
entire University of Minnesota, not just 
the law school. 
Fellows said the failure of most states 
to adopt community property laws, in 
spite of their income tax advantage, was 
the result of an unwillingness to give 
women property rights based on their 
contributions to the family. In a majori-
ty of states, including Minnesota, a hus-
band may have the duty to provide for the 
"maintenance" of his wife, but her right 
to "his" wages is contingent on surviv-
ing him; nor can she direct the disposition 
of that money unless she survives him. 
The problems with the criminal law 
from a women's perspective are being 
debated in the popular press as well as in 
law journals. Acquaintance rape, the 
facts of a battered woman's life, the 
blame rape victims face when pro-
secuting their rapists, sentencing of sex 
offenders, and intraspousal immunity 
from rape are being examined. Many 
who look at these issues call for change 
in the law and for change in society. 
Feminist Jurisprudence is not just for 
women. It is not about replacing all the 
male values with female values. It is 
about being inclusive of women, and of 
all people who differ from the norms of 
the law as it is today. The endeavor will 
necessarily shake up established relations 
between the family, the workplace and 
the state. Lawyers, judges, legislators-
all of us-should get ready for the 
changes. 
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